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Petitioner, Anthony S. Earle, hereby replies to those
new matters raised in the brief of respondent•

POINT I

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MATTERS
RAISED BY PETITIONER,

Through procedural arguments, the State encourages
this Court to limit the scope of its review to very narrow
technical issues.

The State goes so far as to argue that this

Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of
Mr. Earle's arguments.

The law is to the contrary.

The

Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over all extraordinary
writs.
§ 3.

U.C.A. § 78-2-2(2) and Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII
This includes Writs for Habeus Corpus. Rule 65B(a), Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure.

And, while Habeus Corpus is not a

substitute for appellate review, it is available "where the
requirements of law have been so disregarded that the party is
substantially and effectively denied due process of law, or
where some such fact is shown that it would be unconscionable
not to re-examine the conviction."
P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987).

Wells v. Shulsen, 747

A quick review of the procedural

background of this case demonstrates the utter disregard of

Mr. Earle's constitutionally protected rights to effective
counsel and to a valid plea process.
After Mr. Earle's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
was denied by the trial court on April 2, 1984, he was left
without the aid of counsel to pursue any remedy he might have
had.

Proceeding pro se, Mr. Earle has attempted numerous

times to present the merits of his case to various courts.

He

filed two Habeus Corpus Petitions, one in August of 1987, and
one in August of 1988. Both were dismissed on procedural
technicalities.

Still proceeding pro se. Mr. Earle

attempted to appeal the dismissal of his Habeus Corpus
Petitions, but the Court of Appeals dismissed, also on
procedural technicalities.

He then filed a Motion to Reinstate

the Appeal, but the Court of Appeals denied it and remitted the
matter to the District Court.
The inadequacy of those proceedings was the explicit
focus of Mr. Earle,s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this
Court.

The filing of that Petition on August 3, 1989, was

followed shortly on August 10, 1989, by Mr. Earle7s 14-page
pleading entitled "Mandamus."

That pleeiding further detailed

the technical and substantive errors in the trial court and in
the various Habeus Corpus proceedings and in the Court of
Appeals7 review.

The State never responded to either the

Petition for Certiorari or the Mandamus pleading.
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Mr. Earle's

Petition was granted by this Court without limitation or
qualification on October 26, 1989.
Now, after the law and the prior proceedings have
been exhaustively reviewed and briefed, the State once again
seeks a technical victory on issues which it could have and
should have raised a year ago in response to the Petition for
Certiorari.

The State's "shell game" approach to Mr. Earle's

case is deplorable.

Each of the cases cited in Point I of the

State's responsive brief to support a technical application of
appellate review are cases involving civil matters where
parties were represented by active counsel on issues not
involving Constitutional liberties.

Surely, the sanctity of

Constitutional rights warrants a less casual approach than the
one now urged by the State.
From the time Anthony Earle entered his invalid
guilty plea, he has attempted to argue the Constitutional flaws
surrounding the plea and the inadequacy of his legal
representation.

He has done this without the aid of counsel,

and without any legal training or experience of his own. To
date, no court has addressed the merits of his claims.
facts are not in dispute.
reconstructed.

The key

The record below has been tediously

The legal standards have been clearly briefed.

The time is ripe for adjudication on the merits.

Justice cries

for a substantive evaluation of whether this human being's

-3-

rights were or were not properly accorded by the courts of
Utah.

POINT II
PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The parties agree that Utah has adopted the two-prong
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.

State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989).

That test

requires a showing that counsel "rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner and 'that a reasonable
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the
result would have been different.'" Id. at 118.
With regard to the first prong, the State now argues
that Mr. Earle has not proven the substandard performance of
his various counsel.

This argument asks an incarcerated

prisoner to do what is nigh impossible under even normal civil
circumstances —

to prove the negative.

It should be enough

for a defendant to plead his counsel's lack of investigation,
lack of a Bill of Particulars, lack of procedural motions on
evidence and witnesses, lack of alibi witnesses, lack of
information on proper plea practices, lack of appeal, and lack
of assistance.

If those tasks were performed, the State should

be able to easily demonstrate them by the record.

But the

State can't prove effective counsel by the record because no
-4-

defense pleadings or filings were ever made by any of
Mr. Earle's three different attorneys.
The record does show that Mr. Earle wanted an
evidentiary hearing from the trial court on the effectiveness
of his trial counsel.

The request was denied.

hearing on the propriety of the plea bargain.

He wanted a
The record shows

only that the trial court reviewed the short transcript of its
prior hearing and simply compounded its former error.

The

trial court advised Mr. Earle of his counsels, Mr. Kuramada's,
abilities on appeal, but there wasn't one.
The State now argues that Mr. Earle had "legal savvy"
because of the volume of pleadings he was able to file over the
last six years, as if to suggest he was his own effective
counsel.

This won't do.

It doesn't satisfy Strickland; and

it cynically seeks to use a desperate man's thrashings to show
that he really wasn't desperate, because he was still moving.
Strickland requires the defendant to show that
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness."

Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. While the

opinion did not elaborate to a great degree on the guidelines
counsel should be held to, it did state that counsel owes a
client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of
interest, and a duty to consult with the defendant on important
decisions.

Id. at 688. This includes a duty to make

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
-5-

makes particular investigations unnecessary.

Id. at 691.

These same duties are required by Utah Code Annotated § 77-32-1
(Repl. 1990):
The following are minimum standards to be
provided by each county, city and town for
the defense of indigent persons in criminal
cases in the courts of various
administrative bodies of the state:
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent
person who faces the substantial
probability of the depravation of his
liberty;
(2) Afford timely representation by
competent legal counsel;
(3) Provide the investigatory and other
facilities necessary for a complete defense;
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense
counsel to the client; and
(5) Include the taking of the first appeal
of right and the prosecuting of other
remedies before or after a conviction,
considered by the defending counsel to be
in the interest of justice except for other
and subsequent discretionary appeals or
discretionary writ proceedings.
In State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (1976), this
court stated:
The right of the accused to have counsel is
not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an
appearance in the record by an attorney who
manifests no real concern about the
interest of the accused. He is entitled to
the assistance of a competent member of the
Bar, who shows a willingness to identify
himself with the interest of the accused
and present such defenses as are available
under the law and consistent with the
ethics of the profession.
-6-

Let the State show what was done by any of Mr. Earle's three
court-appointed attorneys, other than to stand by his side at
numerous hearings and to facilitate the process of arraignment,
guilty plea, and sentencing.

Mr. Earle has shown

ineffectiveness of counsel by the complete absence of a record
to support active, involved representation.
evidence is circumstantial.

To be sure, the

But it is no less conclusive than

the proverbial stretch of beach with no footprints in the
sand.
The second prong of Strickland is that the result
would have been different if counsel had performed to a
reasonable standard.

466 U.S. at 119.

The State doesn't want

this Court to even reach this inquiry because Mr. Earle has
made it abundantly clear that if he had been properly
represented and advised he would not have entered a guilty
plea.

All Mr. Earle wants is the State to have to prove its

case on a level playing field and with a full roster of
players on each side.

The law requires it.

The State must

provide it. The time for it is long overdue.

POINT III
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE SHOWS PETITIONER DID NOT KNOWINGLY
AND VOLUNTARILY ENTER HIS GUILTY PLEA.
Even under the "record as a whole" standard it is
clear that petitioner did not knowingly or voluntarily enter
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his guilty plea.

The state acknowledges that the plea

affidavit contained "only a sketch of the elements and facts."
The plea affidavit did not clearly list the elements of the
crimes to which defendant plead guilty or the possibility that
the Mr. Earle could be subjected to two 1 to 15 year
sentences.
Not only was the plea affidavit ambiguous, but the
discussion by the trial court with Mr. Earle was far from
adequate to establish that he understood the possible
sentences, the elements of crimes charged, and the facts to
which he was pleading guilty.

The only time the trial court

even approached the elements and facts was in conclusory
references to the defective affidavit.

When asked if he

understood what he was pleading guilty to, it was Mr. Earle's
attorney who answered.
Mr. Earle.

Counsel's statements cannot bind

A trial court cannot rely on the representations of

counsel when assessing a defendant's knowledgeable and
voluntary entry of a guilty plea.

State v. Vasilacopulous,

756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) cert, denied 765 P.2d
1278.

In Vasilacopulous the court applied the "record as a

whole" standard and held that a defendant's statement that he
had gone over the plea affidavit with his attorney and
understood the contents of the affidavit did not mean that he
knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea and
understood the possibility of consecutive terms.
-8-

Id.

The State cannot assume that Mr. Earle understood and
voluntarily entered the guilty plea just because he had been to
preliminary hearings where details of the crimes were
discussed.

There is no law to support this care-free

suggestion by the State.

Even if the charged crimes were the

same ones Mr. Earle pled guilty to, circumstantial evidence
cannot to satisfy the requirements of Rule 11(e).
In State v. Branch. 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987)
cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988), the court determined
that unless there is evidence demonstrating involuntariness,
pleas are presumed to have been voluntary.

.Id. at 1192.

However, a defendant can overcome this presumption by
presenting some evidence of involuntariness.
1192-93.

Id. at

This evidence shifts the burden back to the State to

demonstrate voluntariness.

Mr. Earle has demonstrated that his

plea was not voluntarily entered, so it should now be vacated
and he should be returned for trial on the merits.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
MR, EARLE'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.
In response to this issue on appeal, the State claims
that Mr. Earle never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.

(Brief at p. 31). However, earlier in its Brief the

State admits that such a motion was made.

(Brief at p. 7).

The fact of the motion to withdraw is what caused the
-9-

District Court to reconsider its initial dismissal of
Mr. Earle's first Habeus Corpus Petition.

The absence of a

formal pleading entitled "Motion to Withdraw" cannot obscure
the facts as they appear in the trial court transcripts.

The

State ought to be more careful in its reliance on
hyper-technicalities.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (Repl. 1982) provides
in part that "[a] plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court."

In State

v. Vasilcopulous, 756 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the
court held that the defendant had shown good cause when he
established he did not enter a knowing and voluntary plea of
guilty.

Vasilacopulous further held that the trial court

abused its discretion by not granting the defendant's motion to
withdraw the guilty plea.

In the present case, the trial

court's denial of Mr. Earle's Motion to Withdraw his guilty
plea was also an abuse of discretion.

The trial court's

refusal to allow withdrawal should be reversed, and the case
should be remanded for trial on the merits.
DATED t h i s
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KV4JXT
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